This paper describes development and performance analysis of an active failure management system for the commuter and business aircraft control recovery. System failures are detected and isolated using a hierarchy of techniques that is chosen to ensure minimal disruption of operations and to minimize the number of false alarms. Successive layers in the diagnostics hierarchy are increasingly invasive. Higher layers will be invoked only when lower layers indicate a potential problem. Once a failure has been detected and identi ed, the failure can be accommodated in several ways, from passive pilot cueing to active autopilot recon guration. This paper also describes some preliminary pilot cueing strategies and displays to alert pilots to true failures, provide guidance on recommended responses, and inform the pilot of any recon gurations.
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Introduction
To achieve safety goals in air travel proposed for the next decade, it will become necessary, among other measures, to actively deal with and recover from a large class of aircraft system failures. In general terms the class of problems that need to be addressed are common among the different segments of the air transport market. However, there are su cient di erences in the vehicles and their equipment, operations, and commercialization to justify studying the di erent segments of the markets separately. We develop and analyze performance of an active failure management for control recovery system for the commuter and business aircraft.
We focus on commuter aircraft for the regional airlines because commuter airline crashes are far more common than those for commercial transports. Reference 1] provides data on the circumstances and malfunctions associated with commuter airline crashes during the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] . Study places the 118 crashes studied into 10 mutually exclusive categories. Of these, the largest numbers of cases cited were due to mechanical failure during climb-out, cruise, and approach (20) and to loss of control on takeo /landing (22). Although aircraft icing falls somewhat lower on the list above, we include it here because we believe it too is amenable to advanced control solutions. We address detection, isolation, and accommodation of selected mechanical failures as well as aircraft icing. Such failures will be uncovered by failure detection and system parameter identi cation and dealt with using a combination of pilot cueing, and autopilot recon guration wherever feasible.
We select the class of jet aircraft to be examined along with a general model representative for that class suitable for simulation studies. We dene several candidate failure scenarios (e.g., aircraft icing, failures of control surface actuators, stuck or oating control surfaces, etc.) that are both common occurrences and amenable to improved control solutions. In this paper we develop detection algorithm and an algorithm that allows the rapid on-board identi cation of the parameters associated with a six-degree-of-freedom nonlinear model of an aircraft and parameters associated with individual actuators.
The parameter ID uses time-domain signals, but initial parameter estimates can also be obtained from linearizations of the nonlinear system about several operating points. For the timedomain parameter ID, we assume that we can measure all control inputs and states, and that the state derivatives can be computed from the state values (see later section). Noise at the input (e.g. wind gust) a ects the measured state and actual state in the same way, so it can act as additional excitation which can actually help parameter estimation. Noise at the output (e.g. unmodeled dynamics) a ects the measured state but not the actual state, so output noise leads to errors in the parameter estimates.
We are currently developing autopilot reconguration algorithms to accommodate failures wherever possible and to provide pilot cueing to inform the pilot of the current situation, potential responses, and any autopilot recon guration. Performance is determined by simulations of the failure detection and system parameter identi cation algorithms, and autopilot recon gurations under the de ned failure scenarios.
Previous Work
References 3, 15, 14] describe many of the techniques which we use in the current paper. They describe both the parameter identi cation algorithms and their application to aircraft. They also describe various other algorithms and consider the trade o between using recursive least squares v.s. using a batch algorithm on a moving window of data. They also discuss the issues associated with turning o the identi cation when insu cient excitation is present, and e ects of damage occurring (parameters value jumps) somewhere inside a window of data. Standard results for linear least squares problems can be found in 5] and 6]. Reference 7] contains many standard results in linear system identi cation.
Control surface e ectiveness degradation due to icing has been extensively investigated 9, 8] .
Reference 8] describes parameter identi cation for on-ight detection of aircraft icing.
Reference 10] presents a general methodology for adaptive control using multiple models, switching and tuning. This method allows a controller to operate in multiple environments by recognizing which environment is currently in existence and servicing it appropriately. The concept of using multiple models for switching or tuning is not new in control theory. Multiple model Kalman lters were studied in the 1970's. In this paper we present a practical applicatiom of active aircraft failure management system whose adaption is based on on-board aircraft aerodynamic parameter identi cation. This method allows for the pilot cueing strategies to deal with such failures, and for control recon guration strategies to prevent a failed vehicle from entering an extreme ight condition whenever possible.
Active Failure Management
System failures are detected and isolated using a hierarchy of techniques that is chosen to ensure minimal disruption of operations and to minimize the number of false alarms. Successive layers in the hierarchy are increasingly invasive. Higher layers will be invoked only when lower layers indicate a potential problem.
Failure Detection
Failure detection de nes the rst layer in hierarchy. It operates full time and requires no external test signals and includes its own hierarchy of methods.
Hardware-based failure monitors provide the rst line of defense in failure detection. Commuter aircraft today have failure monitors covering various health aspects of the engine, hydraulics, auxiliary power, sensors, actuators, control surfaces, etc. These monitors are particularly useful for isolating simple problems: stuck actuator, surface hard overs, etc. But they are prone to common mode failures that set o multiple alarms simultaneously and contribute to pilot confusion. Many commuter aircraft also have sensors to detect icing, but these too are not always reliable. Thus, we will augment them with other methods.
Model-Based failure detection algorithms provide the next line of defense and are based upon simple comparisons of true aircraft responses to those of an internal model. Parameters for this internal model will be determined using system identi cation.
Failure Isolation
Failure detection in our terminology indicates only a potential failure. We rely on system parameter identi cation, which de nes the next two layers in a hierarchy to both con rm that a failure has occurred and to isolate that failure to a particular element. Reliable system identi cation requires the use of test signals to excite the system to be identi ed. Occasional pilot inputs and scheduled autopilot maneuvers do provide useful test signals for identi cation, but they are relatively infrequent during much of the ight. When the failure detection algorithm indicates a potential failure, it will usually be necessary to inject a test signal to con rm this possibility and isolate the failure. We use classical detection theory methods to strike an acceptable balance between false alarms (detecting a failure where none exists) and misses (not detecting a failure where one exists). Preliminary results will be presented later in the paper.
To minimize disruption to operations, we will rst inject test signals into the null space of the inputs using redundant control surfaces such that these signals (ideally) cancel one another and thereby do not excite aircraft motion. This allows detection of failures among redundant control surfaces, where available, and is particularly useful for identifying changes in surface e ectiveness. Where redundancy does not exist, we will use more general test signals that do excite aircraft motion. In general, test signals must be large enough so as not to be dominated by sensor noise and disturbances (i.e., gust inputs). On the other hand control inputs can not be too large since injecting test signals into the null space of the inputs using redundant control surfaces could be hazardous in the presence of actual failures. This is because the null space is no longer what it was before the failure. These general test signals should produce relatively small accelerations and need only last for a few seconds and even then only when failure detection indicates a potential problem.
Control Recovery
To accommodate failures wherever possible autopilot recon guration algorithms and pilot cueing strategy have to be developed. Pilot cueing is necessary to inform the pilot of the current situation, potential responses, and any autopilot reconguration. Control recovery will allow real-time in-ight updates to the aircraft autopilot in the face of con rmed and isolated failures. As such it is a potential alternative primarily for newly designed aircraft or for retro t aircraft that are scheduled for ight control upgrades. Improved pilot cueing is the more likely option for the older retro t market. Nevertheless, autopilot recon guration will be considered and will likely play a critical role in failures for which control bandwidth exceeds pilot capabilities (e.g., yaw damper). Autopilot recon guration consists of two steps: control reallocation and control recon guration.
For some types of failures, recon guration may be as simple as replacing one failed control surface with another similar surface and possibly making minor gain adjustments (e.g, split surface, where one half fails). In other cases, it may require replacing a failed surface with dissimilar surfaces, which could require recomputing the entire control allocation matrix. In yet more extreme cases (e.g., loss of hydraulics), it may require augmenting traditional control inputs with very non-traditional ones. We refer to all of the mentioned strategies as control reallocation.
Parameter Identi cation
Given a nonlinear dynamical system represented by a system of ordinary di erential equations, with states x and inputs u:
our goal is to identify unknown parameters in the function f. To simplify the identi cation process, we can make use of the fact that if f has certain smoothness properties, then f can be approximated arbitrarily well by a nominal value, f nom (x; u), plus a linear combination of nonlinear basis functions, b(x; u), where the coe cients in the linear combination form the unknown parameter matrix, H.:
(1) where x 2 R n y 2 R p u 2 R m b 2 R q f 2 R n H 2 R n q C 2 R p n p n (2) and and denote residual and measurement noise, respectively.
If only some rows of f(x; u) depend on uknown parameters, then the parameter matrix H can be factored into a known matrix, g x , times a smaller unknown coe cient matrix, H x . H = g x H x H x 2 R n1 q g x 2 R n n1 The size of jj jj decreases as the number of basis functions increases. As the number of basis functions increase, the number of columns of the coe cient matrices, H and H x , also increases.
Knowledge of the physics of the problem allows the choice of a small number of nonlinear basis functions that still give adequately small residual. After the basis functions have been chosen, the value of the coe cient matrix, H, must be determined.
This can be done using either of two methods:
1) Using multiple linearizations 2) Using time domain data
The rst method is used to initialize the parameters when several linearizations are available. The second method is used to re ne the parameters using ight data, and can also be used to update the parameters after a failure has occured.
Both methods lead to a linear matrix equation
for H of the form: F = C H G, with solution:
If the matrix C is chosen so that C g x = I, then C H = C g x H x = H x , so F = ( C H )G = H x G with solution: H x = F G T (GG T ) 1 .
When the G matrix is not full column rank, then a matrix, D, can be used to select only the columns of G that matter.
Parameter ID using Linearizations
Before using time-domain data to update the parameter matrix, H, it is often possi- 
. Time Domain Identi cation
After obtaining initial estimates for the parameter matrix, H, as described in the previous section, time domain data can be used to re ne the parameter estimates. Time domain data can also be used to update the parameters after a failure has changed the values of the parameters.
For our aircraft model, we represent the aero forces and moments with the H x b(x; u) term, while all other terms of the dynamics may be put into f nom (x; u). This is because minor failure of the aircraft can signi cantly change the aero coe cients, while having only a small e ect on the mass and moment coe cients in f n om(x; u) and g x .
If the aero coe cients themselves are considered as nonlinear functions of the state, those nominal nonlinear functions could either be put into the f nom (x; u) function, or H x could be considered as a nominal nonlinear function plus a linear perturbation to be estimated. H x (x; u) = H x0 (x; u)+ H x . Noise on the states can cause the nominal nonlinear table lookup values f nom (x; u) and H x0 (x; u) to be noisy, therefore the states should be ltered before being used in those functions. It is assumed that x and u can be measured with sensors. Then by comparing the di erentiated value of the measured x with the computed values of f nom (x; u) and b(x; u), the coe cient matrix H x can be computed.
The least-squares procedure for determining the parameter matrix acts to average out any high frequency noise introduced by di erentiation of the noisy state. One concern is that the noise can cause biases in some cases, so any ampli cation of the noise due to di erentiation of the state could increase the size of the bias. It has been shown in 4] that if b(x; u) = u and there is no noise on u, then the least squares parameter solution will not be biased.
After acquiring k samples, let F k = C _ x(t 1 ) f nom (x(t 1 ); u (t 1 )); :::; 
while the inverse covariance matrix update is:
where 0 < 1 is a forgetting factor on the old data which replaces data that is i samples old with i times that old data.
Once we have a solution for H xk , we can obtain ( H) k = g x H xk
In order to obtain a well-conditioned identication computation, it is necessary to have sucient excitation, either from pilot maneuvers or external signal injection (e.g. sinusoids, square waves, or random noise).
When there are redundant actuators, then signals can be injected into the kernel of @ f(x; u)=@u without a ecting _
x. This type of injection can be used to identify the additional terms in @f(x; u)=@u that are not identi able from aircraft maneuvers alone. The external signal generator is only turned on when the failure detection ag signal has exceeded some threshold size. This prevents excessive actuator wear, and avoids annoying the pilot. The pilot can see the surfaces moving when signals are being injected, and if the kernel of @ f(x; u)=@u is not accurately computed, the injected signals could have some a ect on _ x; which the pilot would feel. If the batch least-squares solution is used this time interval is xed, but with the iterative solution, the parameter identi cation can be turned o whenever the error has decreased below some threshold value.
Pilot Cueing
A preliminary design of a cueing system for a hierarchy of active ight management techniques is presented in this paper. The automation in the system for active management of aircraft system failures, both active and passive, is responsible for detecting, isolating, and potentially compensating for upset conditions. It is vital that the pilots be aware of the automation as the automation manages faults. Thus, among the preliminary designs introduced in this paper, a dedicated display is necessary to support the pilot's awareness of the automation as it performs its tasks.
The full set of displays in the pilot cueing system is derived from a framework DR00] of information requirements that addresses situation awareness by explicitly representing the automation as an agent that performs fault management tasks (detect, diagnose, prognose, and compensate) in the operational environment (either environment, system, aircraft, or mission). Given a prioritization and categorization scheme, alerts are realized on multiple displays including aural alerts, visual cues and symbology on existing ight displays, dedicated messages, and nally a dedicated situation awareness display. Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual design of a Control Upset Automation Situation Awareness (CUASA) display. There are three primary components: (1) the primary ight control surface display, which depicts the control surface displacement within the scale of its (possible revised) limits, (2) the control authority display, which conveys to the pilot what the new limits (placed on the control inputs by the automation's reconguration) are on the three degrees of freedom: roll, pitch, and yaw, and (3) the message area, where dedicated messages alerting the pilot to automation-related tasks are presented. 
Control Recon guration
In-ight system parameter identi cation ultimately provides the potential for in-ight control law recon guration. We address robustness to identi cation errors by limiting authority of parameter corrections derived from system identication.
The controller is parameterized with the coe cients in the H matrix, provided by the parameter identi cation algorithm. The controller starts out with the nominal value of the parameters, and is updated continuously with the current estimate of the parameter values. The dynamic inversion controller uses the plant model given in Section 7.1. Let f 0 (x) = f(H x ; x; 0) and G 0 (x) = @f(Hx;x;0) @u :
The desired dynamics are of the form: With u 2 R m , m outputs can be controlled with these m inputs. Let C 2 R m n be a matrix that selects which combinations of the state will be controlled. Then, the portions of the desired dynamics that can be obtained are:
Setting the right hand side of this equal to the right hand side of: 
Simulation Results
Model-based monitoring and diagnosis of a physical system requires well-constrained dynamical models of the system. The ability to generate models that accurately describe dynamics of system behavior in normal and faulty conditions is the key to modeling for diagnostics.
Aircraft Model
Let v be the body-axis velocity, ! be the body-axis angular rate, e 3 be a unit vector in the down direction (third column of the rotation matrix from inertial coordinates to body coordinates), and let h be the altitude. Let the inputs consist of a subvector of thrusts, Thrust 2 R m1 and a subvector of surface de ection, 2 R m2 . Let The individual actuators are represented as third order systems. The torque dynamics are represented by a rst order lag and the surface dynamics are represented by a second order system. This lag is connected to the surface dynamics through a switch that has three positions: 1) During normal operation the output of the lag goes through a switch into the surface dynamics. 2) In the case of a stuck surface, a high gain forces the surface position to a stuck position. 3) In the case of a oating surface, no actuator torque is applied to the surface dynamics. Therefore, the oating surface position is driven entirely by the aerodynamic hinge moment.
Aircraft Parameter Initialization
The basis functions are chosen so that all the aero terms scale with dynamic pressure. To calibrate this system that is quadratic in speed, we need at least two linearizations at two di erent speeds, since at a single speed, the top four rows of b(x,u) are dependent: 1
The only nonzero rows of H are the top 6 rows, so C will be chosen to select all or some of the top six rows. This means that only the top 6 rows of f nom (x; u) need to be computed, so if Euler angles are used instead of the e 3 part of the state, it will not matter. In order to compute H based on linearization data, we need to compute the partial derivative of f nom (x; u) and b(x; u). To simplify the expressions, we will assume that we are trimming about a value of the state that has ! = 0 . 
Failure Scenarios
The set of failure scenarios to be addressed will include speci c conditions (e.g., aircraft icing, control surface e ectiveness degradation, stuck or oating control surface, etc.) that occur often and are amenable to advanced control solutions. We will handle icing conditions and control surface e ectiveness degradation by modifying the coecients in the aerodynamic tables. Individual control surface e ectiveness degradation will be implemented by scaling the corresponding column of the surface e ectiveness matrix. Unlike the situation with stuck and oating surfaces, control surface e ectiveness degradation cannot be detected by fault detection and isolation sensors. Therefore detecting these types of faults requires system identi cation techniques. Control surface effectiveness degradation faults always cause sudden changes in aerodynamic coe cients, while ice buildup slowly changes aerodynamic coe cients.
This has an impact on the identi cation techniques used. Various identi cation techniques that will be considered are documented in the bibliography ( 3, 5, 7, 14, 4, 6, 15] .)
Aircraft performance characteristics are directly dependant on the aerodynamic quantities of the aircraft, especially lift and drag. The loss of performance due to lift and drag degradation and impact of icing on the stability behavior of an airplane observed in some accidents 11, 12] have increased the awareness about the signi cance of aircraft icing. Studies conducted at the NASA Lewis Research Center have indicated that in icing condition aircraft dynamics experience a decrease in lift and an increase in drag compared to the clean aircraft. These e ects could be observed even with the ice protection system activated. Dimensionless stability and control derivatives for the longitudinal ight dynamics of the Twin Otter have been estimated for both clean and iced conditions, and are available in the literature ( 13, 2] ). It is assumed that icing a ected only the derivatives.
Fault Management Simulation Tests
Active fault management system, uses the aircraft model described in the subsection 7.1, and compares the state derivative of the detection model with the derivative of the states of the actual aircraft. Since we don't have an actual aircraft to work with, we simply compare the detection model with the "truth" model of the aircraft during system performance analysis simulation tests.
The aircraft model could be considered to contain two major parts: the 6-dof aircraft in one part, and the actuator dynamics in the other part. Therefore the detection model is also separated in that way. The 6-dof aircraft model is done in a uni ed way, using vector notation, while the actuator dynamics are done separately for each of the four actuators. In this paper we will present only results from the simulation that exercises the fault detection, isolation, and accomodation for the 6-dof aircraft, together with the truth model of the aircraft and all actuators. Realistic noise and bias are added to the sensors, and Dryden gust models have been incorporated into the simulation. Gust levels 1, 2, and 3 correspond to a standard deviation of gust magnitude of 0ft/sec, 5ft/sec, and 10ft/sec respectively.
We have a list of faults to choose from, each represented by a di erent perturbation to the H x matrix. Each fault introduces a random change in the coe cients in the last 3 rows of the aileron, elevator and rudder de ection columns of the H x matrix (Modeling aileron, elevator and rudder effectiveness degradation). Figure 2 shows results of a Monte-Carlo simulation in which 1000 simulations were run. For testing purposes, we chose a simulation with two successive faults. Fault sizes were randomly varying from 0% to 50% in size, and gust level was 3. Each fault was fault number 4 which denotes perturbing 3 3 block of coe cient matrix H x that corresponds to _ p; _ q;_r rows and a ; e ; r columns.
After each fault occurs, a pitch doublet, yaw doublet, roll doublet, and speed step are introduced to give su cient excitation for I.D. In each case the detection algorithm determined the fault in a timely way and the fault isolation code computed an estimate of the new aero torque coe cients (the bottom half, i.e. the last three rows of the H x matrix). The least-squares procedure described in earlier sections was used. The controller had a bandwidth of w c = 3 rads s in the three attitude loops, and a bandwidth of c = :3 rad s in the speed loop. The bottom plot on Figure 2 shows the ratio of the time the estimator was on to the total time for fault. The fault size is determined by averaging the size of the change in the perturbed parameters. Some points of interest on these charts are any points that are on either axis. Points on the vertical axis represent false alarms (no fault, but estimator is on), and points on the horizontal axis represent missed detections (there is a fault, but estimator does not turn on). The top plot on Figure 2 shows the amount of time after a fault occurs before the estimator detects the fault. Points that would be on the line 'never turns on' if it were extended are missed detections, and faults that are below the 'never turns on' line on the vertical axis are false alarms. Points on the horizontal axis (delay time = 0) are the result of the second or third fault occurring before the ID signal has completely receded from the previous fault.
To illustrate quality of parameter estimation we show simulation results from a test in which a random fault was introduced to the aileron, elevator and rudder (aileron fault 21:92%, elevator fault 21:15%, rudder fault 31:50%. Simulation results are shown in Figure 3 . The detection algorithm determined failure in a timely way. Failure isolation code computed an estimate of the new aero torque coe cients (the last three rows of the H x matrix coresponding to _ p, _ q, _ r), after the detection algorithm determined that there was a failure. The least-squares procedure described earlier was used and estimation error was smaller than 3:3%. 
Conclusion
This paper describes the initial phase of development and analysis of an active failure management system for control recovery of commuter and business aircraft. Failure detection algorithms that can reliably detect and isolate system failures with minimal disruption of normal aircraft operations have been developed. To accommodate identi ed failures wherever possible, autopilot recon guration algorithms and pilot cueing strategy have been addressed. Pilot cueing is necessary to inform the pilot of current situation, potential responses, and any autopilot recon guration . Preliminary versions of failure management has been implemented for the 6-dof aircraft with promising results. 
